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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. ) 
DOUGLAS D. BISHOP, ) Case No. 890122-CA 
Trial Court No. 86-C0487W 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appeal is taken from a judgment and conviction 
entered against Defendant/Appellant on the 6th day of 
October, 1988. Notice of Appeal was filed by prior counsel 
for Appellant, Kevin E. Kane, on or about November 7, 1988. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this 
matter by virtue of (the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, 
Section 1 et seq.,) Section 78-2A-1, et seq. Utah Code Ann. 
(1953 as amended), and (Rule 3 R.Utah Ct.App.) 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This appeal is taken from the conviction and judgement 
entered against Defendant/Appellant on the 6th day of 
October, 1988 in the Rich County District Court for the 
State of Utah, Central Division (Case No. 86-C0487W). The 
case was tried before a jury, the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, Presiding Judge of the First Judicial 
District Court 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
improperly denying the motion made by counsel for Defendant 
at trial to dismiss the charge of escape from prison (U.C.A. 
76-8-309), inasmuch as the escape was from a county 
facility, and not the State Prison. 
2. Whether Defendant's conviction of escape as a second 
degree felony rather than a class B misdemeanor, inasmuch as 
the escape was from a county facility and not the State 
Prison, amounted to a denial of Equal Protection of the law. 
3. Whether the trier of fact erred, in light of the 
evidence adduced at trial, in not applying the defense of 
compulsion permitted by U.C.A. 76-2-302. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-8-309 (1973) 
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from 
official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if: 
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly 
weapon against any person to effect the escape; or 
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the 
state prison. Otherwise, escape is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this 
section, means arrest, custody in a penal institution, jail, 
an institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, or 
other confinement pursuant to an order of the court. For 
purposes of this section a person is deemed to be confined 
in the Utah state prison if he has been sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided 
or the prisoner is not on parole. 
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping 
confinement in the state prison shall commence from the time 
the actor would otherwise have been discharged from the 
prison on the term or terms which he was serving. 
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Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-302 (1953 as amended) 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he 
engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to 
do so by the use of threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his 
situation would have resisted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of Defendant. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was convicted in 1983 and 1984 and sentenced 
to serve 5 years to life and committed to the Utah State 
Prison in 1983. 
While at the Utah State Prison, a request for 
protection was filed by Defendant, and thereafter, prison 
authorities transferred Defendant to the Rich County Jail 
for his protection. 
On the 17th day of February, 1988, Defendant escaped 
from the Rich County Jail, was rearrested and charged by 
Rich County authorities with: 
(a) escape (second degree felony); 
(b) injuring a jail facility (third degree felony); and 
(c) theft of a motor vehicle (second degree felony). 
DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the 
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following offenses: Count I: escape, a Second Degree Felony, 
Utah Code Ann, 76-8-309; Count II: injuring a jail, a Third 
Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann, 76-6-418; Count III: theft of 
an automobile, a Second Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann, 76-6-
412. 
For these convictions, Defendant was sentenced as 
follows: Count I: a prison term in the State Prison of not 
less than 1 nor more than 15 years, to commence at the time 
Defendant is discharged from prison on the terms which he is 
presently serving; Count II: a prison term not to exceed 5 
years to run concurrently with the term set forth in Count 
I; and Count III: a prison term not less than 1 year nor 
more than 15 years to run concurrently with the term set 
forth in Counts I and II. 
Defendant was delivered into the custody of the Warden 
of the Utah State Prison in execution of his sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State prison in 
1983. 
2. Defendant was placed in maximum security when 
admitted to the Utah State Prison and remained in various 
parts of maximum security throughout his stay at the Prison. 
(Transcript, page 131, lines 15-20; page 20, lines 10-12). 
3. On March 16, 1984 Defendant made a Request for 
Protection at the Utah State Prison. Because of the 
offenses for which he was serving his sentence and because 
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of the notoriety of his brother, Arthur Gary Bishop, 
Defendant felt that his life was in danger. (Transcript, 
page 15, lines 3-12). 
4. June Hinckley, Prison Records and Identification 
Officer, testified that Defendant had been assaulted during 
his stay in the State Prison in maximum security sections. 
Three incident reports were filed in the Prison Records as a 
result of an assault on Defendant by another inmate. 
(Transcript, page 17, line 24 to page 18, line 1; page 20, 
lines 19-24). 
5. Defendant testified that even though he was housed 
in maximum security, because of threats from the inmates 
against his life, he feared for his life. (Transcript, page 
134, lines 21-24; page 135 line 6-25; page 139, lines 5-13). 
6. Defendant testifies that he read an article 
concerning himself and his brother in which Prison Warden 
Jeff Galley stated that both brothers had been put in 
maximum security and acknowledged that this was for their 
safety from other prisoners. (Transcript, page 153, 154). 
7. A Utah State Prison inmate, Robert Roy Wimmer, who 
was serving a sentence at the same time as Defendant was 
killed by fellow inmates while housed in maximum security. 
(Transcript, page 31, line 16 to page 32, line 14). 
8. A Chronological Note was filed after Defendant was 
assaulted with a razor by another inmate. (Transcript, page 
139, lines 12-22; page 18, line 8-9). 
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9. Defendant testified that because of his fear of 
other inmates, he tried complaining through the prison 
grievance system, but such complaints were futile, thus he 
filed a civil rights complaint in federal district court. 
(Transcript, page 143, lines 1-5). 
10. Because of his fear of other inmates and the 
Prison's concern for his safety, Defendant was transferred 
to the Rich County jail on the Prison's Outcounty Program on 
July 1, 21, 1986. (Transcript, page 15, line 3-12; page 10, 
lines 20-21; page 25, lines 4-14). 
11. The Utah State Prison and Rich County were under a 
contract agreement whereby some prisoners were sent to serve 
their time in the Rich County jail. (Transcript, page 22, 
lines 22-25; Prosecution exhibit #8). 
12. At the Rich County Jail, Defendant was housed with 
inmates Earnest Wilcock, an ex-highway patrolman and Robert 
Balsamo, an ex-parol officer at the State Prison. 
(Transcript, page 104, line 23-page 105, line 4; page 105, 
line 21 - page 106, line 1). 
13. Inmate Wilcock testified that he was party to a 
"joke" whereby he and the other inmates told Defendant that 
he was being sent back to prison. (Transcript, page 107, 
lines 17-21). 
14. Defendant testified that he heard a newscast about 
the Outcounty program, and not seeing the entire segment was 
told by Balsamo that the county jail facilities were going 
6 
t'l i I I I I I I 1 I i i I [ ) 1 I I t . t l < * I 1 f H I f i . . - 3 
officers only and that anyone else or. *^cti ^} . _i be 
sent back to the new facilities it ' le n -*h St^t-p Prison, 
wh i cl i :uai used, Def endai it mi ich ri n i , i a;. * • , 
1 i ne 1 5 t o page 156, 1 1 ne 1 4 ) . 
15. Defendant testified that wh: - incarcerated n the 
Rich C o i I n t y j a i ] B a 3 s a in c:> t e a s e • r - \ i • u i :: w a s 
going to be taken back to the Ut M . •. *- 1: .--jr, * K: Wilcock 
and another inmate, Si vKhu;s aqre^i: *?:at there ha.1 ---- a 
state prison car c :- ^ - ) 
b e 1 i e v e t h a t: 1: i e w o u 1 d b e s - , t i <-. K *^ t i - Prison. 
(Transcript, page 155, I ines 4-7). 
] 6 , Officer Farren Floyd of tl le Ri ch Conn ty Sher i f f f s 
o f £ i c e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e k i i e t / o f t: h e i nm ates teasing 
Defendant that he was to be sent back to the r! " State 
P r i s o n a n d o £ Defendant's p a r a n o :I a s t e i n in, :i n g 
teas i i i g , ( T i: a i I s c i: i p t, page 119 1 1 n e s 11 -15; page 122, lines 
3-12). 
fefendai*, 'estified tnac the d i s p a t: c h e i: a t: t: 1 I e j a j 1 
. r , ;on never let the j "ri 1 know1 wl len the 
rri5i;n ^c.*.^ ,.--* ^ o oi 'k up •-. prisoner, thus Defendant felt 
that the ja 1 1 p e r s o n n e w.ruldr * b*=> a b l e *v :-*-i± h i m i f 
thei: t,j \ i =»!] : e p •. • -. •. K r *• * p r i s o n . 
( T r a n s c r i p t , p a g e 1 5 6 , < m e 14 * [:dge 1 5 7 . l i n e . 2 ) . 
1 8 . I n m a t e V l i l c n c k t e s t i f i e d +V-*t JI. m e e v e n i n g o f 
Febi: i lai: y "1 7 • - - : , j*-:.r ->r * ..,v t r ie r e wa? a S t a t e 
transportation car outside the Rich County jail which made 
Mr. Bishop "paranoid" because of his fear of being sent 
back. (Transcript, page 109, line 7 to page 110, lines 11-
13). 
19. Defendant testified that on February 17, 1988, 
after being told by Slykhuis that Slykhuis had heard talking 
in the outer offices of the jail about a Prison 
transportation car coming up the next morning to get 
Defendant to take him back to the Prison, that at or about 
7:59 p.m. Defendant threw a set of dumbbells through the 
garage door of the Rich County jail and fled the premises. 
(Transcript, page 41; page 69, lines 3-10; page 70, lines 6-
11; page 157, line 13 to page 159, line 13). 
20. After leaving the jail, Defendant took a Chevrolet 
S-10 truck from the Diamond W. Implement, Randolph, Utah. 
(Transcript, page 159, line 15-19). 
21. Defendant was spotted by Wyoming police at about 
12:35 a.m. on February 18, 1988 in Baggs, Wyoming and chased 
him into Colorado. (Transcript, page 56, lines 10-24; page 
58, lines 4-12). 
22. Defendant was apprehended by police outside of 
Craig, Colorado and detained in the Moffat County jail in 
Craig. (Transcript, page 60, lines 12-18; page 161, line 19 
to page 162, line 8). 
23. Defendant testified that he fought extradition back 
to Utah because he feared for his life if he were returned 
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: ison. (Transcript, 
page 162, i inn ii -<• pd^je IrO ; • ne 3 
. i[. : --\ * n^ Moffat *-M. r-v ' ;: : Defendant .** -?•- H 
J: • . ; trice explaining that 
• »- .ert ;it.
 3j •:. ( ounty Jail because rie feared being taken 
back to ?-:.,*. "* <'• ?i-ate Pr1.^-- 1 + *:at- -ie feared f • n.is 
. • . r ison. (Transcript, 
page 163 line 4 t:n p-ngo .'..-i, 1 •'^  
J:-", defendant was charged : + v; escape trom 
r* ^  < -r-, • > :^.icny; injuring
 ;ai. 
laciiily ,i : n i i ri degree felony; .;i *'\-4'-t •- : \ iotor 
vehicle, a second degree felony. (Transcript, pace I i TIPS 
2-9) 
26. In a jury trial, held before the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, Defendant was convicted on all charges. 
(Transor- < ^ 
- " •.. nvictions, Judge Christoffersen sentenced 
Defendant :c ^ ter:1 • : t_i~e State -'ris^n for r^-+ ' *ss +^an 1 
year a: ~l not r. - < . - * > he 
fi i i: -, •_» . the terms i : ..h.<„h *-* .vas seiviu. r r:> i^i'e of 
his escape. 
2 q . Defendant , through c o n n s p l Ki'vin b Kane . jpyea led 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant was denied Equal Protection of the law. 
Because Defendant was on the Prison Outcounty program, his 
escape from the Rich County jail was a second degree felony. 
However, a similarly situated inmate, convicted of the same 
crime, yet ordered to serve his time in a county jail 
without being committed to the prison, could only be 
convicted of a class B misdemeanor for a similar escape. 
Thus, for the same crime, and the same non-violent situation 
of the convicted persons, they receive substantially 
different punishment under the law. 
2. The facts presented at trial establish that 
Defendant was in fear for his life if he were returned to 
the Utah State Prison, and that it was this fear that 
compelled him to escape from the Rich County jail and flee 
the state. Under these circumstances, Defendant is entitled 
to the statutory defense of compulsion under Utah Code Ann. 
76-2-302. Under the jury instruction, the State failed to 
present evidence that the compulsion that caused the escape 
had disappeared. Therefore, since the compulsion was still 
present, Defendant was still entitled to his defense at the 
time he was apprehended. 
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BETA I !, UK TDK AHGUMIiNT 
I . 
INASMUCH AS DEFENDANT ESCAPED FROM A f'OUNTY F A C I L I T Y , 
rr * : , % * ON i \n A SP:<:"(.>NI.> P E U K E E F K L O N Y IA-YTHER T H A N 
A CLASS ^ MISDEMEANOR AMOUNTED TO A DENIAL OF EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THF LAW 
-
 r
 * -ut-r i constitution 
guarantees to everyone withi: t:»? jurisdiction •: <i itate 
the equa. protection of -he l^vs v,hi^ requires that in the 
admit:-> t: a" : *• : : r- .*, pe:\> : be subjected 
to different punishment for -it. offense than that tc ;n: r.h 
others of the same class are subjected, 
• • . i L nvi nte< p 
second degree ieiony; '— was ^entencen -,)ne ro fifteen years 
in the state pi i son: •=<-- W H S -•:^' •: \ *"•-- • r-^  * uv rribuii, and 
becaust *.-.* ^:<-?j : )n-violent 
circums tances ., t :u. s behavior, he w-.s 'sent "o a county jail 
on an Outcounty program,., ^ escape from the county 
jail "•''*'-;••:•?.3! ' -ha: je-i * . •: 3 second degree 
felony ai'.d sentenced one fifteen years in the state 
prison to r -.ir, consecutive with hi sodomy sentences. 
A similarly situ.i - -:* •'• : - ' - -
tffeu «-.-. sentenced onp \.,- fifteen years »•'. : •* ,-tate pr;son( 
yet because of the non-violent c , 1cumstance- : t -
behavior, t.he ^ida«~ :;;a- •: ;•-
.:•;'•:•/ /,..-.. - "idf person escapes from the county jail, 
] ] 
he can only be charged and convicted of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Thus for the same initial conviction, the same 
sentence, and escape from the same facility, Defendant and 
another similarly situated inmate receive vastly different 
punishment. This clearly is not equal protection under the 
law. 
There is one difference between Defendant and the 
fictional inmate similarly situated as described above. In 
the example, Defendant was "committed" to the state prison, 
while the other inmate would be merely ordered to serve his 
time in the county jail. This distinction, however, is 
procedural, not substantive. The fact that Defendant is 
sent to the county facility is evidence that he is in the 
same class substantively as the inmate that is ordered to 
serve in the jail following his sentencing -- both are 
considered non-violent and suitable inmates for a county 
facility, rather than being housed in the state prison. 
II. 
THE TRIER OF FACT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DEFENSE OF 
COMPULSION PERMITTED BY UTAH CODE ANN. 76-2-302 
Utah Code Ann. 76-2-302 provides that "A person is not 
guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or 
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
12 
or a third person, "which force or thrpat pn^ il for CP H p^ i son 
(it reasonable tirmness in his situation would ru'1 have 
resisted." 
In State * . Tut tie, 730 P * 2u o3( " * V « •.- 1:1 le I It ah 
,Sup] Court uphel 1 the elements : . .- defense of 
compulsion as I nstructed by the t i: :i a] court: 
The defense of duress or compulsion is available only 
I£ the following conditions existed at the time of 
escape: (1) The defendant was faced with a specific 
threat of death or substantial bodily injury in the 
immediate future. (2) There is not time for complaint 
to authorities or there exists a history of futile 
complaints which make any result from such complaint 
illusory, (3) The prisoner immediately reports to the 
proper authorities when he has attained a position of 
safety from the immediate threat. Id. at 632, n. 3. 
:^;L ete with evidence that Defendant 
truly ana reasonably believed that ne was faciei .. r H 
specific threat- .-if substantia. bua±jLy xxiju: •-
Defe :;•:: . at thp P: on c;o .* « - > . 
communicated to nim mat .u- was q- in: * be sent taeR to the 
state prison, .vhere Defendant knew that h.r raced tro 
real ;:••; •- . • •• ..ruled threat-. • death. * „...-. 
servinc t; - state prison Defendant was the object O 
several threats and actual assaults by other inmates. Both 
t h e p i: :I s o n in a i i a g e in e n t i n n:i a k i i i g- -*:. - 4 : .- - • . * t h e w a i: d en in 
the newspaper article,, acknowledged that Defendant was i n 
dange r , even in maximum security. A1 so t:he f ac t t: 1 Ia t: a 
s i m i 1 ^  r o-: - • t u a t: e d i n m a t e w a s k i 1 1 e c:i i i i nit a x ::i m i i m s e c u i i t y 
shows mat Defendants fears wer e well founded. 
As t ; element (2), Defendant testified that it would 
have been futile to make a complaint to the authorities. 
There was a history of his Inmate Grievance Forms availing 
nothing when requesting transfers to safer quarters while in 
prison. At the Rich County jail, Defendant heard the 
dispatcher express her aggravation that the state didn't 
tell the county when they were coming to pick up prisoners 
to take them back to the state prison. So Defendant 
believed that his present custodians would not have known 
about the transfer. 
It is the third element that was difficult for the 
Defendant at trial -- the requirement to immediately report 
to the authorities after the threat of imminent harm is 
over. 
In Tuttle the Court explained the third element of 
duress by stating, "while a defendant may be forced to 
escape a specific threat, the defense does not give an 
escaped convict a license to remain indefinitely at large." 
Id. at 635 (emphasis added). In Tuttle, the defendant 
escaped on August 21, 1984 and was apprehended in February 
1985, a period of five months, clearly enough time to 
overcome the state of mind induced by the duress of threat 
of substantial bodily harm. However, in the present case, 
Defendant escaped at 7:59 p.m. February 17, 1988 and was 
apprehended less than 5 hours later. It seems clear from 
the testimony adduced at trial that Defendant was still 
under the effects of duress that compelled him to escape. 
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Unl ike Tuttle, Bish : v • " 
thinking whi ch wou l J .., »j prompted ; :. " * . • himself in to 
authorities he believed could protect him f r -jm t*.. Imminent 
harm from which he fled. It was n--^* ^ f ^ ' * * iter it. 1 01 1 
!: o escape the 'punishment he open J1, acknowledged ;<e deserved 
for the crimes he committed; i.t-*- ..J.T ::<-<: ^iy -ryino to escape 
a situation, which to him, way a vei •- * : 1 1 s 
1 if e, 
Utah Code Ann. ^ 6 ~ 2-302 pro*- :dns a defense for inmates 
that escape because .-f n e use oi threatened imminent u^e ^ f 
u n I a w f u 1 p h y s I c a, I, £ o r c e against them,,. Defendant escaped 
because of the threatened imminent use of phys:/-a, • :r:e 
against hi m shot i ] d, he be retu:ne-: \.u uie state •* . -
a, d d i t: „:i o i I a, J 1 a i i g i I a c, e n u t , : m -i r b e pie :n e n t s Tuttle 
concerning reporting to i-.rie authorities after the escape, as 
the court pointed cu* •- r • -:* .-. w~ . i escape* 
from r einai i :i i i ig "i i ic> : - -
 ; *.\: :;.-. This element is 
consistent with the purposes i • ne defense, But t.a.Ken in 
the context ' * * ** • *:a -f * u was nanae-~ * i It 
seenii! < *i - •* - ^ ^ is distinguishable. 
Defendant IILJ '^ . t remain indefinitely at lane period of 
less than five --r.wi - fleeing irto edioininq state to 
escape t • -« ! * .-t ^ ' • • < * ireat to 
life exists aimot [H .onstrued ^s intei/ remain 
indefinitely at large. 
1 1J"he I • ; i . 1 • • - o f t: 1 :i„e s t:a t:i i, I:a \ /oi i] • I seem to i: equi i: e an 
inmate to turn himself into the authorities once the threat 
of harm had passed. This requirement should take into 
account the state of mind that compelled the defendant to 
take the drastic course of escape at the outset, and not 
impose technical requirements on a person fleeing for his 
life to telephone the state prison from the first phone 
booth be encounters. 
In the present case, Jury Instruction No. 4 instructs 
the jury that they "must find each of the following." The 
third element states, "That the Defendant reported his 
compulsion or duress to authorities immediately after the 
compulsion or duress disappeared." This instruction would 
seem to meet the purpose and language of Utah Code Ann. 76-
2-302. However, the prosecution did not offer any evidence 
that the compulsion or duress of Defendant had disappeared. 
Thus, the State failed to offer evidence that would rebut 
Defendant's defense of compulsion or duress as to the third 
element. Therefore, if the jury believed that the Defendant 
was faced with a specific threat, and that there was a 
history of futile complaints, Defendant should have been 
availed of the defense of compulsion requiring that the 
charges of escape and injury to a jail be dismissed unless 
the State presented evidence on which the jury could 
reasonably find that the duress and disappeared, or that 
sufficient time and circumstances had .passed to evidence a 
Tuttle-like refusal to turn himself in and remain 
16 
i n c J e i i n i t c l y <! I r j j i j t . 4 i i r i i ' H i ' o i i i p u 1 •»J i »i i I l i ad p a s s e d . 
CONCLUSION 
r*-f~' J !< . *-d HtjWH I p r n t e o t i o n n i l 1 luj ! a w 
because n^ was given proportionately greater punishment t ;r 
the sairu- oondu.-t- -* - others similarly situated. rI " , :, 
' V f A - ^- . - • < « :::c:)i) n t: ::: •-: - • a • t h e coi n I c t i 01 1 
escape from tn^ state prison, or , in the alternati ve, reduce 
\ ".x- sentence on the ocnviclicji* iiom a second degree felony 
Under the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. 76-2-
302, Defendant fulfil l^, I the? \ equ i remenns - f the defense "-f 
compul sion, rv --:---:i-fr 
overturn the .a-nvict ions of escape and i.nj.^v + •. j ; a. . in 
light of the fact that, he was x:\c. -v defense of compu:;s= '-r -it 
the time ot '* - : 
granted a new fr:ai .. -a,ion : \r* nrier of fact oe instructed 
to consider Defendant's acrioi - accordance with the 
purposes of the de£ense :> I: - ; se t fo:i : t: 1 : 1 i ,. U bah. 
Code Ann. 76-2-302 and State v. Tuttle (supra). 
Dated this w day of July, 1989 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSE* I 
Herm Olsen 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postpaid, to the 
Attorney General, State of Utah this day of July, 
1989. 
18 
